Motivated by the problem of data breaches, we formalize a notion of security for dynamic structured encryption (STE) schemes that guarantees security against a snapshot adversary; that is, an adversary that receives a copy of the encrypted structure at various times but does not see the transcripts related to any queries. In particular, we focus on the construction of dynamic encrypted multi-maps which are used to build efficient searchable symmetric encryption schemes, graph encryption schemes and encrypted relational databases. Interestingly, we show that a form of snapshot security we refer to as breach resistance implies previously-studied notions such as a (weaker version) of history independence and writeonly obliviousness. Moreover, we initiate the study of dual-secure dynamic STE constructions: schemes that are forward-private against a persistent adversary and breach-resistant against a snapshot adversary. The notion of forward privacy guarantees that updates to the encrypted structure do not reveal their association to any query made in the past. As a concrete instantiation, we propose a new dual-secure dynamic multi-map encryption scheme that outperforms all existing constructions; including schemes that are not dual-secure. Our construction has query complexity that grows with the selectivity of the query and the number of deletes since the client executed a linear-time rebuild protocol which can be de-amortized. We implemented our scheme (with the de-amortized rebuild protocol) and evaluated its concrete efficiency empirically. Our experiments show that it is highly efficient with queries taking less than 1 microsecond per label/value pair.
Introduction
The constant occurrence of data breaches has generated a lot of interest from academia, industry and government in the subject of encrypted search and, in particular, in encrypted databases (EDB). Because EDBs can protect data at all times-even in use-they inherently provide stronger security and privacy guarantees than standard database systems. There are several ways in which a data breach can occur: (1) the server that runs the database system is compromised; (2) the database itself is somehow exfiltrated; and (3) the application is compromised and the database is retrieved using the standard database interface. The first threat can be modeled as a persistent adversary that controls the database server at all times. The second can be captured by a snapshot adversary that only gets a copy of the database at specific points in time. Note that the third cannot be addressed using cryptographic techniques because once the adversary compromises the application and gets its credentials, it is indistinguishable from the application.
Encrypted search solutions have traditionally been designed to address persistent adversaries with the understanding that security against a persistent adversary implies security against snapshot adversaries. While this is indeed the case for most static constructions, it is not necessarily true in the dynamic case. 1 In fact, solutions designed specifically against a persistent adversary could still leak information to a snapshot adversary that one would expect to be hidden. Indeed, this can happen if the query or update operation modifies the encrypted structure in a way that depends on some previous query. The resulting leakage persists and can therefore be observable by a snapshot adversary. We stress that there are very natural constructions that work this way including [5, 6, 16, 29] . The problem of designing snapshot-secure EDBs, therefore, is non-trivial and is even more challenging when security against both a persistent and a snapshot adversary is required.
Currently, the known forward-private EMMs are the SPS construction by Stefanov et al. [38] , the Sophos construction of Bost [5] , the TWORAM construction by Garg, Mohassel and Papamanthou [18] , the EKPE construction by Etemad, Küpçü, Papamanthou and Evans [16] , and a recent construction by Lai and Chow [29] . Recently, Bost, Minaud and Ohrimenko [6] presented the first backward-private EMM, a notion that was informally introduced in [38] . At a high level, backward privacy guarantees that queries do not reveal their association to deleted documents. While there are no known attacks that leverage the lack of backward privacy, improving the security guarantees of EMMs is well-motivated. Snapshot security. While most STE constructions are known to be adaptively-secure against a persistent adversary, as far as we know, no previous work has considered STE in the context of snapshot adversaries. Informally, a persistent adversary has access to the encrypted structure and has access to the transcripts of the interactions between the client and the server. A snapshot adversary, on the other hand, only has access to the encrypted structure (but at various times). Given that snapshot adversaries are clearly weaker, it motivates the following natural question:
Can we design efficient and dynamic EMMs that are secure against a persistent adversary and are (almost) zero-leakage against a snapshot adversary?
We answer this question positively and in doing so introduce a new kind of dynamic EMM which are efficient and secure against both snapshot and persistent adversaries. Specifically, these EMMs are forward-private against persistent adversaries and breach-resistant against snapshot adversaries, in the sense that they leak only the size of the structure at the time of the snapshot. Interestingly, while our constructions offer stronger security guarantees than previous work, it also achieves better asymptotic efficiency in terms of query and update complexity, token and encrypted structure size and client storage (under reasonable assumptions).
Our Contributions
In this work, we revisit dynamic EMMs in several ways. Breach resistance. Snapshot adversaries are motivated by the threat of data breaches. In such a scenario, the adversary is not necessarily the server itself but some other party that gets access to a copy of the encrypted structure at some point(s) in time.
We propose a formal definition of snapshot security which, intuitively, requires that a copy of the encrypted structure reveals nothing about the structure and the past operations beyond what is revealed by a well-specified leakage function we refer to as the snapshot leakage. We then say that an STE scheme is breachresistant if its snapshot leakage reveals at most the current size of the structure. Our notion of breach resistance is similar to the notion of offline security of Lewi and Wu in the setting of property-preserving encryption (PPE) [30] . The IND-CPA-DS definition in [27] also tries to capture snapshot security in the PPE setting, but it only holds for single snapshots and semi-dynamic schemes (that do not support deletes). We also show that, breach-resistance implies some interesting and previously studied notions such as (a weaker version) of history independence [35] and write-only obliviousness [4] .
We stress that our notion of breach resistance applies only to the encrypted structures we design and that, as pointed out by Grubbs, Ristenpart and Shmatikov [20] , there are non-trivial implementation questions that have to be considered when they are integrated into real-world systems. Forward privacy. Much like recent works, our proposal is also forward-private. Our scheme, DLS, does not make use of ORAM simulation [18, 38] or public-key operations [5] . Furthermore, its query complexity grows only with the number of delete operations performed since the client executed (linear-time) rebuild protocol; as opposed to the Sophos [5] and Diana [6] constructions whose complexity grows with the total number of deletes ever performed. Our construction is also much more efficient as it only uses simple symmetric-key operations as opposed to other schemes which use publickey operations or constrained PRFs. Compared to the EKPE construction [16] , which is not snapshot-secure and forward-private only for add operations, DLS offers better asymptotics if the scheme is used in scenarios in which the structure has more frequent updates and less frequent queries.
Surprisingly, we find that forward privacy does not imply breach resistance. While this may seem counterintuitive, it reinforces the need of rigorous security analysis of STE constructions against different types of adversaries. In fact, several known forward-private constructions are not breach-resistant [5, 6, 16, 29] . For instance, in [16] , an adversary that observes multiple snapshots can tell if a search occurred or not because entries are deleted as part of the search operation. It can also learn the exact size of the result set if snapshots were taken before and after a search operation. This leakage is already more than just the size of the data structure as required by breach resistance. For the Sophos [5] and Diana del [6] constructions, a snapshot adversary can learn if or when a delete occurs if deletes are not handled in the same structure. Dual security. After formally defining snapshot security, we construct, as far as we know, the first provablysecure breach-resistant encrypted multi-map. In addition, our construction is also forward-private which means that it can be used to protect against both persistent and snapshot adversaries. We refer to such constructions as being dual-secure. Our scheme, DLS, achieves both notions of security, and we achieve our desirable asymptotic query complexity by an explicit rebuild protocol that must be executed by the client at certain times. We show, however, that the protocol can be de-amortized and we call this variant DLS d . 3 To sum up, DLS features the best query, token size, client memory, update and storage complexity among all dual-secure schemes in literature. Experimental evaluation. We implemented DLS d (the variant with de-amortized rebuilding) in Java and evaluated its performance on the Wikipedia dataset. Our experiments show that this construction is highly practical. We ran experiments on up to 83 million label/value pairs on an Amazon EC2 instance with 32 vCPUs and 60GB of memory.
DLS d is compact, producing EMMs of size 9.4GB for a 3.6GB folder composed of 554, 059 files. It has a search overhead less than 1 microsecond per pair for selectivities spanning from 100 to 10, 000 pairs. On the other hand, it has an update overhead of around 100 milliseconds per pair. This slowdown is mainly due to the de-amortized rebuilding protocol.
Preliminaries
Notation. The set of all binary strings of length n is denoted as {0, 1} n , and the set of all finite binary strings as {0, 1} * .
[n] is the set of integers {1, . . . , n}, and 2 [n] is the corresponding power set. We write x ← χ to represent an element x being sampled from a distribution χ, and x $ ← X to represent an element x being sampled uniformly at random from a set X. The output x of an algorithm A is denoted by x ← A. Given a sequence o of n elements, we refer to its ith element as o i or o[i]. If T is a set then #T refers to its cardinality. Given strings x and y, we refer to their concatenation as either x, y or x y. Basic structures. We make use of several basic data types including dictionaries and multi-maps which we recall here. A dictionary DX of capacity n is a collection of n label/value pairs {( i , v i )} i≤n and supports Get and Put operations. We write v i = DX[ i ] to denote getting the value associated with label i and DX[ i ] = v i to denote the operation of associating the value v i in DX with label i . We denote by L DX the set of labels stored in DX and by #DX the volume of DX which is the number of label/value pairs it holds which is n = #L DX . A multimap MM with capacity n is a collection of n label/tuple pairs {( i , v i )} i≤n that supports Get and Put operations. Similarly to dictionaries, we write v i = MM[ i ] to denote getting the tuple associated with label i and MM[ i ] = v i to denote operation of associating the tuple v i to label i . We denote by L MM the set of labels stored in MM and by #MM the volume of MM which is
Multi-maps are the abstract data type instantiated by an inverted index. In the encrypted search literature multi-maps are sometimes referred to as indexes, databases or tuple-sets (T-sets) [8, 10] . Given a sequence of operations op = (op 1 , . . . , op n ), each of which can be a query, an addition or a deletion, we denote by add(op) the subsequence of addition operations and by del(op) the subsequence of delete operations. We further define the subsequence of update operations as up(op) = add(op) + del(op). Basic cryptographic primitives. We make use of encryption schemes that are random-ciphertext-secure against chosen-plaintext attacks (RCPA), 4 and pseudorandom functions (PRF). For definitional details, we refer the readers to [10, 26] .
Definitions
Structured encryption schemes [12] encrypt data structures in such a way that they can support operations on encrypted data. With encrypted data structures, we can distinguish between different types of operations. This includes non-interactive and interactive operations where the former require only a single message and the latter require several rounds. We can also distinguish between response-revealing and response-hiding operations, where the former reveal the answer to the query and the latter do not.
STE schemes are used as follows. During a setup phase, the client constructs an encrypted structure EDS from a plaintext structure DS under a key K. If the scheme is stateful, this setup procedure also outputs a state st. The client then sends the encrypted structure EDS to an untrusted server and keeps the state st and key K private. The client can then query EDS using the supported operations. If the operation is noninteractive, the client sends to the server a token tk constructed with its key K, state st and query q. The server then uses the token tk to query the encrypted structure EDS. If the operation is interactive, the client and server execute a two-party protocol where the former inputs K, st and q and the latter inputs EDS.
Self-adjusting encrypted structures.
A data structure is self-adjusting if it re-arranges itself after being queried or updated. This is usually done to maintain correctness, consistency or to improve efficiency. We provide below the syntax of a self-adjustable STE scheme. Note that, here, the update operation is interactive which is not a requirement. In the subsequent parts of this section, we will only focus on rebuildable STE. The proposed definitions can be naturally extended to self-adjusting STE schemes.
Security Against a Persistent Adversary
The standard notion of security for STE guarantees that: (1) an encrypted structure reveals no information about its underlying structure beyond the setup leakage L S ; (2) that the query algorithm reveals no information about the structure and the queries beyond the query leakage L Q ; and that (3) the update algorithm reveals no information about the structure and the update beyond the update leakage L U . Naturally, if the scheme has a rebuild protocol then we require that it reveals no information about the underlying structure beyond the rebuild leakage L R . If this holds for non-adaptively chosen operations then the scheme is said to be non-adaptively secure. If, on the other hand, the operations can be chosen adaptively, the scheme is said to be adaptively-secure. This notion of security was first formalized by Curtmola et al. in the context of searchable encryption [13] and later generalized to structured encryption in [12] . Definition 3.3 (Adaptive security [12, 13] 
there exists a ppt simulator S such that for all ppt adversaries A, for all z ∈ {0, 1} * , the following expression is negligible in k:
Forward privacy. An important property for dynamic STE schemes is forward privacy which was introduced in [38] to address some of the limitations of dynamic SSE constructions at the time. The informal requirement described in [38] was that forward-private SSE schemes should not reveal if the file in a file update operation (i.e., a file add or delete) has keywords that were searched for in the past. This was formalized in [5] for AddFile operations as
where f ⊆ W is a file.
Security Against a Snapshot Adversary
In the standard notions of security for STE, the adversary is assumed to be the server itself. As such, we seek security guarantees against an adversary that sees not only the encrypted structure but all the search and update operations as well. In many real-world scenarios, however, we are concerned with a weaker adversary that, only periodically, gets access to the encrypted structure and, in particular, does not get to see any query or update operations. This adversarial model captures, for example, data breaches, malicious employees and device theft. Such an adversary is called a snapshot adversary.
We propose a new security definition for STE against snapshot adversaries. In our definition 3.4, the adversary has access to multiple snapshots each of which is interspersed with a batch of operations. Intuitively, we require that the encrypted structure reveals no information about the underlying structure and the sequence of operations executed prior to the multiple snapshots, beyond some snapshot leakage L SN . Surprisingly, we demonstrate that for a particular class of snapshot leakage, (multiple) snapshot secure STE schemes imply insertion independence, a variant of history independent data structures [35] , and can also provide a write-only oblivious structure [4] . 
Definition 3.4 (Snapshot security
Breach resistance. Ideally, the snapshot leakage of a scheme should be as small as possible. With this in mind, we deem that an encrypted structure should be regarded as breach-resistant if its snapshot leakage is at most the size of the plaintext structure at the time the snapshot is taken. For the remainder of this work, we focus on designing a multi-map encryption scheme that is secure against both persistent and snapshot adversaries. Specifically, we require that the scheme be forward-private against a persistent adversary and breach-resistant against a snapshot adversary. We refer to schemes that meet these two properties as dual-secure.
Definition 3.6 (Dual security). Let Σ be a dynamic rebuildable structured encryption scheme with leakage
profiles Λ Per = (L S , L Q , L U , L R ) and Λ Sna = L SN .
We say that Σ is dual-secure if it is forward-private and breach-resistant.
Implications of breach resistance. We demonstrate that breach resistance implies some interesting and previously studied notions of security including a weaker notion of history independence [35] and write-only obliviousness [4] . Due to lack of space, the details appear in the full version of this paper.
DLS: A Dual-Secure Multi-Map Encryption Scheme
We now describe our construction, DLS, which is a dualsecure rebuildable multi-map encryption scheme. Unlike SPS [38] and Sophos [5] , DLS does not make use of ORAM-like techniques or public-key operations. In addition, while Sophos and Diana [6] have query complexity that is linear in the number of delete operations ever executed, DLS's query complexity is linear only in the number of delete operations executed since the last rebuild operation. The rebuild protocol is linear in the size of the multi-map and can be de-amortized while maintaining snapshot security. In the following, we present a description of the construction followed by a detailed analysis.
Detailed Description
DLS makes use of a pseudo-random function F and of a private-key encryption scheme SKE. contains only labels that existed within the previous version, i.e., the previous rebuild epoch.
Setup outputs the old and new dictionaries as its encrypted multi-map. The old dictionary DX o is populated as follows. In order to store
, where version g is the current rebuild epoch (the rebuild epoch at setup time is initialized to 1). To store the pair in an encrypted way, a PRF evaluation is performed on the concatenation of the label , its counter count and the rebuild epoch version g . The corresponding value in MM[ ] is first concatenated with the string edit + and then simply encrypted. The new dictionary DX n is only instantiated and remains empty. The output of the setup algorithm includes the encrypted structures (DX o , DX n ), the keys as well as the state. Search token. The Token algorithm takes as input a key, a state and a label. First, it fetches from both the old and new state dictionaries the corresponding counters and rebuilding versions. Recall the old and new counters, count o and count n , count the number of times the label has been added, deleted from the old and new dictionaries, respectively. Based on the counters, whether old or new, it creates two subtoken vectors such that otk = (otk 1 , · · · , otk counto ) and ntk = (ntk 1 , · · · , ntk countn ). The old subtokens otk i , for i ∈ [count o ], will allow the server to query the old dictionary DX o , while the new tokens ntk i , for i ∈ [count n ], will allow the server to query the new dictionary DX n . Finally, it updates the state by adding to S e as it is now searched. The output includes the state and the token tk = (otk, ntk). Query. The Query algorithm takes as input the token and the encrypted data structure. The token is divided into two sub-token vectors, otk and ntk. Each sub-token in otk corresponds to a label in the old dictionary DX o from which the server fetches the value and inserts in the result set, Result. The server performs the same operations for every sub-token in ntk, but on the new dictionary DX n . The server finally outputs the result set
Update token. The UToken algorithm takes as input a key, a state, and an update consisting of the type of operation op, a label , and its value v. It first computes tk 1 which is a PRF evaluation on the concatenation of the label, its counter and the current rebuilding version. The counter represents the number of times the label has been added to the new dictionary DX n throughout the current rebuilding version, and is fetched from the new state dictionary DX st n , given the label . The counter is then updated accordingly. The value v is concatenated to the operation op before being encrypted, and this represents the second part of the token, tk 2 . The output of the algorithm includes utk = (tk 1 , tk 2 ) and an updated state. Update. The Update algorithm takes as input the update token and the encrypted data structure. The server will simply update the new dictionary DX n by adding the update token, utk = (tk 1 , tk 2 ), to it. The output of the Update algorithm consists of the updated encrypted structure. Rebuilding. The Rebuild algorithm is a two-party protocol between the client and the server. The client's input is a key and a state, while the server's input is the encrypted data structure. The goal of the rebuild operation is to merge the old dictionary into the new one. The new one will then become the old at the end of the rebuild. The rebuild differentiates between two types of labels: (1) labels that have been searched for in DX o , and (2) labels that have not. For each of the labels in S e , the client fetches all the values corresponding to ∈ S e , removes all values that have to be deleted and then insert the remaining ones into the new dictionary DX n . Inserting these values into DX n follows a similar process to the one in UToken and Update algorithms. For the remaining labels, i.e., labels that have never been searched for in DX o , the client picks a random label, fetches a value with the largest counter and inserts it into the new dictionary DX n . The client updates the state by decreasing the counter of the selected label and removes it whenever it equals 1. Once all labels have been reinserted, both the old state dictionary DX st o and old dictionary DX o are deleted, the set S e is reinitialized, the new state dictionary DX st n and new dictionary DX n becomes the old state dictionary DX st o and old dictionary DX o , and the epoch is incremented. The output of the Rebuild is an updated state for the client and an updated encrypted structure for the server.
In order to achieve snapshot security, the entire transcript of the Rebuild protocol, including its internal state, has to be kept secret. That is, a snapshot adversary must not get a snapshot of the encrypted structures while the Rebuild protocol is executing. This is mainly due to the fact that while rebuilding searched for labels, a snapshot adversary will get to know the response size of the searched for labels; which is clearly at odds with our security goals that consist of only disclosing the size of the data structure.
We show how to lift this constraint in Section 5.
Efficiency. The query complexity of DLS is
where del( , e) is the number of deletes for since epoch e when was most recently searched for (i.e., since the last rebuild during which was a searched for label). As a point of comparison, the Sophos construction of Bost [5] and the Diana construction of Bost et al. [6] have query complexity
where del( , 0) denotes the number of deletes for since the structure was setup. The storage complexity of DLS is
while recent constructions [5, 6] 
i. C computes and sends,
ii. S computes DXn[tk1] := tk2; iii. C increments countn; 3. while #DX 
DLS's amortized rebuild complexity is
where MM e [ ] denotes the tuple associated to label at epoch e. This is because for all e ∈ N, we have
from which it follows that the total rebuild cost is
If rebuilds are executed every O(#L MM ) operations, we get the amortized cost above. Note that this is a very loose asymptotic upper-bound and that, in practice, DLS's amortized cost will be much lower. Finally, the client locally stores the state composed of both the old and new state dictionaries, and the set of searched for labels. That is, client storage is
Variants. While DLS improves on the query, update and storage complexity of all previous dynamic EMM schemes, its token size is larger. This can be improved using one of the following three approaches. The first reduces the token size to be O #up( , c) . It consists of using the counter-based approach for the old dictionary; that is, granting the server the ability to compute all encrypted labels for the old dictionary (as π dyn ). Given that all new updates are going to be added to the new dictionary, the server, with a key derived from the label, can generate all the encrypted labels. That is, the client will only send a key along with the new token ntk which has size equal to the number of updates for in the current epoch.
The second approach leverages constrained pseudorandom functions, introduced in Diana [6] . The client can simply send two constrained keys for the required ranges for both the old and new counters. This approach reduces the token size to be
when using GGM [19] as the constrained PRF.
The third approach is the combination of the first two approaches. The client sends a token composed of: (1) a key for a standard PRF with which the server computes all encrypted labels in the old dictionary; and (2) a constrained key for the appropriate range in the new dictionary. The size of the search token in this case is O log #up( , c) , when using GGM as the constrained PRF.
This last variant of DLS outperforms all previous constructions in query complexity, update complexity, token size, query round complexity and client and server storage-all while being secure in the standard model. DLS can also be easily modified to have constant client memory by storing the state on the server in a zeroleakage encrypted multi-map, e.g., using ORAM at the cost of an additive poly-logarithmic overhead per query.
Security
In the following, we detail the leakage of DLS against standard and snapshot adversaries, respectively. Against a persistent adversary. The setup leakage of DLS consists of the size of the multi-map MM. The query leakage of DLS for a label consists of the search, response length and operation patterns. The search pattern captures if and when the label has been searched for in the past. As DLS is response-hiding, it does not reveal the access pattern but only the response length which is the cardinality of the result. The operation pattern reveals if an operation for a label was an update (i.e., an add or delete) or not. The update leakage of DLS is the size of the tuple to be updated. The rebuild leakage is the size of the updated multi-map and, for each label that was searched for in the current epoch, the number of deletes in DX o . We now give a precise description of DLS's leakage profile and show that it is adaptively-secure with respect to it. Its setup leakage is
The query leakage is
Here, QP is the query pattern which reveals if and when a query is repeated. More formally, it is defined as QP = B, where B is a binary square matrix of size t and t is the total number of operations that have been made. B is such that B i,j = 1 if the ith and jth queries are the same, and 0 otherwise. The response length pattern is
The operation pattern is
where m is a binary vector of size t, where t is the total number of operations. For all i ∈ [t], m i = 1 if the ith operation is an update and m i = 0 otherwise. Its update leakage is L U (MM, (op, , v) ) = #v, for all op ∈ {edit + , edit − }. Its rebuild leakage is
where #del o is number of pairs with label removed from the old dictionary DX o and S e ⊆ L is the set of labels that were searched for in the current epoch.
Theorem 4.1. If SKE is an RCPA-secure encryption scheme and F is a pseudo-random function
The proof of Theorem 4.1 appears in Appendix A. Leakage against a snapshot adversary.
where MM i is the current version of the multi-map. Note that, given L SN , DLS is breach-resistant based on Definition 3.5.
Theorem 4.2. If SKE is an RCPA-secure encryption scheme and F is a pseudo-random function, then DLS is m, L SN -snapshot secure, for m ∈ poly(k).
The proof of Theorem 4.2 is in Appendix C.
Corollary 4.3. DLS is dual-secure.

DLS d : DLS with De-amortized Rebuilding
In Section 4, we introduced an instantiation of the rebuilding protocol with a worst-case complexity linear in the size of the old dictionary, i.e., in
, , it has the same setup, search token and get algorithms, but differs on how the rebuilding process is performed. We now provide a gradual description of this process starting from our previous rebuild protocol. We can de-amortize the Rebuild protocol of DLS by simply operating on one label at a time in the case of a searched label, or on a pair in the other case. This solution provides a de-amortized rebuilding and clearly does not introduce any additional leakage against a persistent adversary. Unfortunately, this solution still induces additional leakage against a snapshot adversary because it can differentiate between the two types of labels based on the number of pairs that have been inserted into the new dictionary. Remember that our goal is to have snapshot leakage composed only of the size of the current structure. So far, this is not the case as we have an additional leakage.
We solve the issue above by allowing some client storage. That is, instead of inserting an arbitrary number of pairs in the case of searched for labels, only λ pairs are inserted and the remaining pairs are kept in the client side. For the unsearched for labels, the same number of pairs, λ, is similarly inserted in the structure. This will make differentiating between the two types of labels impossible for a snapshot adversary. De-amortization. An important design decision we have to make is to figure out when to rebuild. There are three possible approaches, including:
-at update time: this approach runs the deamortized rebuild steps as a sub-routine of the update protocol. That is, whenever the client updates the encrypted structure, the client simultaneously performs a partial rebuilding that operates on λ pairs. Note that this choice is natural as a snapshot adversary already knows that a data structure has been modified due to the update operation. Therefore performing a partial-rebuilding that is triggered by an update will not leak more than the number of rebuilt pairs, which is λ. -at query time: this approach consists of running the de-amortized rebuild step as a sub-routine of the query protocol. In this case, it is easy to see that a snapshot adversary would learn that a search occurred by just looking to the encrypted structure, which violates breach-resistance and, therefore, dual security. -continuously: this approach runs the de-amortized rebuild steps continuously in the background. This is quite similar to the previous rebuild protocol except that the client can always query or update the structure independently of the rebuilding process. In other words, the rebuild does not affect the correctness of the query operation. This approach provides the client with the flexibility to rebuild the data structure whenever it is required (which is not the case of the previous approaches).
Our preferred approach is to execute rebuild steps at update time. In the following, we provide the algorithmic details. Note that the syntax of the STE scheme will change slightly because we are now dealing with a selfadjusting EMM. We refer the reader to Definition 3.1 for more details. Details. DLS d is a self-adjusting dynamic encrypted multi-map composed of four non-interactive algorithms and one interactive protocol such that DLS d = (Setup, Token, Get, Update, Rslv). Below, we only detail the Update protocol as Setup, Token, Get and Rslv remain the same as in DLS. The pseudo-code details of DLS d appear in the full version of the paper.
Update is a two-party protocol between the client and the server. The client's input consists of a key K, a state st and an update u. The server's input consists of the encrypted multi-map EMM. The state is the same as the state of DLS except that it is augmented with the de-amortization rate λ and two lists L sr and L un . L sr is a stash that stores the pairs corresponding to the searched for labels, while L un is a stash that stores the pairs for the unsearched for labels.
The client starts by creating the update token and sending it to the server which then inserts the updates in the new dictionary using DLS UToken and Put algorithms, respectively. The client then samples a bit b. If b = 0, the client rebuilds a searched label in L sr , otherwise it rebuilds an unsearched label in L un . If #L sr < λ or #L un < λ, it means the client does not hold enough pairs in the stashes to rebuild and needs to prepare additional pairs as follows.
If it is rebuilding searched labels and #L sr < λ, then the client picks a label ∈ S e , where S e contains all the searched for labels. The client fetches the corresponding pairs from the old dictionary DX o , decrypts them, removes all the deleted pairs, and appends the remaining pairs to L sr . The client then removes the label from S e . When it is time to send pairs to the server, it generates λ freshly encrypted pairs from L sr to send. Similarly to the UToken algorithm, a fresh pair is composed of two sub-tokens. The first, tk 1 , is the evaluation of the pseudo-random function on the label , the global version version g , and a counter count n . The second, tk 2 , is generated by encrypting the value v corresponding to the label concatenated to the string edit + .
Otherwise, if it is rebuilding unsearched labels and #L un < λ, the client retrieves an unsearched label uniformly at random from L MM \ S e and only retrieves one pair using the label's counter. The client then decrements the counter and updates the state accordingly. If the counter is less than one, it removes the label from the state, DX st o . The client refreshes the pair similarly to the operations described earlier, but then appends it to L un . The client repeats this process as long as #L un < λ. Finally if both the stashes are empty and each pair in DX o is refreshed, the server deletes the old dictionary and the new dictionary becomes the old dictionary. The client similarly deletes the state of the old dictionary and replaces it with the state of the new dictionary. A new empty dictionary and state are initialized for future updates. Finally the client increments the global version. Efficiency. DLS d has the same query complexity, storage complexity and token size as DLS. Below, we only detail the client memory and update complexity. DLS d introduces two new data structures that are stored at the client. The first, L sr , stores the pairs for the searched labels and has size
The second, L un , stores the pairs for the unsearched labels and has size O(λ). In addition, similarly to DLS, the client also stores the state which is composed of both the old and new state dictionaries, and the set of searched for labels. This results in
storage at the client. The overall client storage is then
The update complexity is O(λ + #v) with two rounds of interactions. 5 The first round fetches the pairs and sends the update token to the server and the second inserts the freshly encrypted pairs from the states along with the updates.
Security
In the following, we describe the leakage of DLS d against persistent and snapshot adversaries, respectively. Leakage against a persistent adversary. The setup and query leakage of DLS d is the same as DLS. The Update leakage consists of the update leakage of DLS and the de-amortization rate which is public. Note that, contrary to DLS, there is no explicit rebuild leakage since the rebuild process is de-amortized and executed as a sub-routine of the update operation.
The update with rebuild leakage is then
, λ is the rebuild rate of the Update protocol, and S e ⊆ L is the set of labels that were searched for in the current epoch. 
The proof of Theorem 5.1 appears in Appendix B. Leakage against a snapshot adversary. The snapshot leakage
Note that λ is a public parameter so DLS d is breachresistant. 
Empirical Evaluation
We now evaluate how our construction performs in practice. We implemented DLS d , the de-amortized variant of DLS, in Java using the Clusion encrypted search library [34] . It consists of 1114 lines of codes excluding 180 lines for testing purposes calculated using CLOC [14] . We set λ to 3 for all experiments except for one where we vary λ to study its effect on update time. Parsing and indexing. We used the parsing and indexing functionality of the Clusion library to process data (which is itself based on the Lucene parser [31] ). Through Clusion, our implementation handles pdf files, Microsoft Office files (doc, docx, pptx, xlsx), basic text files. For media files, it only indexes the file names. Cryptographic primitives. We use the cryptographic primitives provided by Clusion (themselves based on Bouncy Castle [11] ). For symmetric encryption, we use AES in CTR mode with a 256 bit key. We use of HMAC-SHA256/512 for PRFs. Experimental setup. We ran our experiments on an Amazon EC2 instance running Ubuntu Linux (c3.8xlarge) with an Intel Xeon E5-2680 v2 (Ivy Bridge) Processor with 32 vCPU and 60 GB of RAM. For all our experiments, we used the Wikipedia data dumps. The total uncompressed size of our dataset was 26.5GB. There are a total number of 2, 681, 795 files in this dataset. We partitioned these files into different folders. The first folder had 17, 600 files with a total size of about 250 MB and the last folder had 554, 059 files with a total size of 3.6GB. In our empirical evaluation, we want to quantify the following characteristics of DLS d :
1. The time to set up the EMM as a function of the number of pairs; 2. The size of each EMM and of the client state as a function of the number of pairs; 3. The time taken to respond to a query for labels with different selectivity as a function of the number of pairs. The selectivity of a label is the number of values associated to it; 4. The time taken for an update operation as a function of the number of pairs in the EMM. We also measure how different rebuild parameters λ affect the time taken; 5. The effect of de-amortized rebuilding on the time taken by a query operation in DLS d specifically when there are deletes involved.
Setup time and storage overhead. Fig. 3 describes the time taken to set up an EMM as a function of the number of label/value pairs stored. We created EMMs with number of pairs ranging from 2, 758, 254 to 83, 239, 341. The setup phase takes under 13 minutes with a multi-threaded implementation. 6 Fig. 4 shows the size on disk of both the client state and the EMM for different number of pairs. We observe that even for about 83 million pairs, the client state is only 210MB for an 11GB EMM. Recall that in scenarios in which client memory is expensive (e.g., in the case of email clients [3] ), the state can always be outsourced using ORAM at the cost of a poly-log overhead. Also note that DLS's state is (asymptotically) the same as all recent forward-private schemes [5, 6, 16, 29] . Search and update operations. Fig. 5 describes the time taken to search for labels of different selectivities (MM(w)). We also measure time taken by an update operation. In our experiments, the client and server are running on the same machine. We measure the effect of increasing the EMM size on the query time, which seems negligible. We do not send any update tokens between the query operations during the experiment. For each EMM we first search for labels of different selectivities (100, 1000 and 10,000). The search time for all selectivities is less than 1 microsecond per pair. We ran every search data point corresponding to every number of pairs in the x-axis 500 times. We re-ran the whole experiment 10 times, then we took the median. From Fig. 6 we can see that the update operation is more costly as it takes around 100 milliseconds when λ is set to 3. This can be attributed to the fact that the rebuild is performed with the update algorithm. Whenever we do an update, we also execute λ de-amortized rebuild steps. One can see that as we increase λ, the update time increases proportionally. Note also that both the search and update operations are independent of the number of pairs in the EMM. tions. The keyword being queried initially has selectivity 100, 000 which was achieved by updating the EMM with 100, 000 update tokens. The consequence of this is that these values are initially in DX n . The first point of epoch 0 (the green line) represents the first query. After that, we send 8000 delete tokens, execute a search, send 8000 more deletes, execute a search and so on. This continues until we send a total of 40, 000 delete tokens (the end of the green line). At this stage, the selectivity of the keyword is 60, 000 but the total number of pairs in DX n associated with the keyword is 140, 000. During epoch 0 we can clearly see that query time increases as the number of deletes increases.
At some point, the rebuild operation ends and epoch 1 begins and DX n becomes DX o . At the beginning of epoch 1 two queries occur before the keyword has been selected to be rebuilt. The gap in query time between epoch 0 and the first two queries of epoch 1 is due to the fact that the pairs are stored in different sized dictionaries in the two epochs. In epoch 0 they are stored in a relatively empty DX n whereas in epoch 1 they are stored in DX o along with 50 million other pairs (remember that we need to keep updating the EMM to make the rebuild process progress). Once the keyword is selected to be rebuilt (red line), it is moved to the client's local stash; specifically, to L sr since it was searched. At this stage, query time is negligible but increases as the pairs are inserted into DX n . When all pairs have been inserted, DX n only holds 60, 000 pairs associated to this keyword (i.e., all the delete pairs have been removed).
One can clearly see the difference in query time before and after the keyword has been rebuilt. Before it has been rebuilt (i.e., epoch 0 and beginning of epoch 1 which are the green and blue lines, respectively), the query times range from 55.6 ms to 75.8 ms. After being rebuilt (i.e., the end of epoch 1 which is the red line), query times range from 0.1 ms to 33 ms.
Also, note that all query times stay well below 1 microsecond per pair. Comparison with previous constructions. Given the asymptotic overhead of the SPS construction, we do not compare it to DLS d and focus mainly on the Sophos and Diana schemes of [5] and [6] . The empirical evaluations of these constructions are based on C/C++ implementations whereas our implementation of DLS d is in Java. In addition, the Sophos implementation is multi-threaded. Our implementation of DLS d , on the other hand, is only multi-threaded for setup. And while our experiments are in memory and the ones of [5] and [6] are on disk, they are conducted using SSDs which have efficiency comparable to memory. Even with these advantages, the performance of DLS d is better or, at the very least, comparable to those of Sophos and Diana. [5] reports search times ranging from 24 microseconds to 7 microseconds per pair depending on the selectivity of the keyword. On similar datasets, the Diana implementation in [6] is 10 times faster. Similarly to our DLS d implementation, the hardware accelerated C/C++ implementation of Diana takes less than 1 microsecond per pair.
An important distinction between our constructions and Sophos and Diana is in how their query time is affected by delete operations. While the query time of Sophos and Diana will increase with the total number of deletes ever performed, the query time of DLS d will only increase with the number of deletes since the last rebuild (or the current epoch). As shown above, this makes a significant difference in the query time of DLS d . Locality. Several works [1, 9, 10, 15] have considered the design of locality-friendly SSE schemes. While DLS d achieves near-optimal search complexity, it has a nonoptimal locality. This results from the way the plaintext multi-map tuples are stored in the underlying dictionary (each tuple is split and stored in multiple noncontiguous memory locations). While locality had no impact in our experiments (since they were conducted in memory) one might observe a slowdown if the encrypted structure is stored on disk.
It is worth mentioning, however, that DLS d could be made local using techniques from [10] . In fact, the design and approach of DLS d could be used to extend the locality-friendly 2Lev construction of [10] instead of π bas . value pairs for the adversary. To simulate the utk, it takes as input the update leakage which is equal to L U (MM, , v, op) = #v for all op ∈ {edit + , edit − }. To output the rebuilt pairs, it takes as input the public parameter λ and also when a rebuild gets completed. ii. from i = 1 to count, pick and remove a label from vec l and add it to S 1 ; iii. assign S 1 to MM 0 [ ].
(b) Using OP, extract all labels that were updates of from vec n , and add them to S 2 . But if the first rebuild was completed, it simply does the following: (a) using OP, extract all labels that were updates or reinserts of from vec 0 and add to S 1 ; (b) using OP, extract all labels that were updates or reinserts of from vec n and add to S 2 . It then outputs otk = S 1 and ntk = S 2 . Now, we have to show that for all ppt adversaries A, the output of the real experiment and ideal experiment are indistinguishable. This can be shown by standard sequence of games argument that shows that EMM, utk and tk are indistinguishable from the real ones due to the RCPA security of SKE and the pseudo-randomness of F .
Game 0 : It is the same as a real experiment. Game 1 : It is the same as Game 0 except that we replace the function F by a call to random function G. This is indistinguishable because of the pseudorandomness of F . Game 2 : It is the same as Game 1 except that we do not generate any keys and replace encryption steps to simply producing a random string. During rebuild step for a searched for label, we simply remove encrypted values at random from the result set till the result set is of the leaked size. RCPA security of SKE guarantees indistinguishability between a ciphertext and a randomly generated string. Game 3 : We now get rid of G and use random strings for labels. In setup, keep track of all labels (random strings) generated. When generating search tokens, we pick these labels at random for a fresh query as the number of labels originally in the old dictionary for the query is leaked if the first rebuild hasn't been completed. We assign these labels to this particular query for future repetitions till the first rebuild is completed. If it has, these labels have already been re-inserted so using OP, we can retrieve them. We further pick appropriate labels from both dictionaries as the total number of updates and re-inserts in each dictionary and when they were received is also leaked. During rebuild step for unsearched labels, we pick λ labels one by one at random and then replace them with a new random string. This is the same as Game 2 because the output of G and a random string are indistinguishable. Game 3 : It is the same as an ideal experiment. The rebuild step is now essentially equivalent to sending λ label, value pairs (which are both random strings now) whenever Update protocol is executed. Proof. Consider the simulator that works as follows.
1. The snapshot leakage is composed of the total number of label, value pairs in the old dictionary. So the simulator initializes DX 0 and DX 1 of the size
